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ARTICLES 
POLICING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF BODY 
CAMERA EVIDENCE 
Jeffrey Bellin* & Shevarma Pemberton** 
 
Body cameras are sweeping the nation and becoming, along with the 
badge and gun, standard issue for police officers.  These cameras are 
intended to ensure accountability for abusive police officers.  But, if history 
is any guide, the videos they produce will more commonly be used to 
prosecute civilians than to document abuse.  Further, knowing that the 
footage will be available as evidence, police officers have an incentive to 
narrate body camera videos with descriptive oral statements that support a 
later prosecution.  Captured on an official record that exclusively documents 
the police officer’s perspective, these statements—for example, “he just 
threw something into the bushes” or “your breath smells of alcohol”—have 
the potential to be convincing evidence.  Their admissibility is complicated, 
however, by conflicting currents in evidence law. 
Oral statements made by police officers during an arrest, chase, or other 
police-civilian interaction will typically constitute hearsay if offered as 
substantive evidence at a later proceeding.  Yet the statements will readily 
qualify for admission under a variety of hearsay exceptions, including, most 
intriguingly, the little-used present sense impression exception.  At the same 
time, a number of evidence doctrines generally prohibit the use of official 
out-of-court statements against criminal defendants.  This Article unpacks 
the conflicting doctrines to highlight a complex, but elegant, pathway for 
courts to analyze the admissibility of police statements captured on body 
cameras.  The result is that the most normatively problematic statements 
should be excluded under current doctrine, while many other statements will 
be admissible to aid fact finders in assessing disputed events. 
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INTRODUCTION 
After widespread protests of shootings of civilians by police officers in 
2014, a broad consensus arose around the need to outfit police officers with 
body-worn video cameras.1  Proposals to push police departments to 
purchase and use these so-called “body cameras” obtained “overwhelming 
support from every stakeholder in the controversy—the public, the White 
House, federal legislators, police officials, police unions, and the American 
Civil Liberties Union.”2  In New York City, the federal district court that 
found that city’s infamous “Stop and Frisk” program unconstitutional 
ordered implementation of a body camera program as a remedy.3  The judge 
explained that “body-worn cameras are uniquely suited to addressing the 
constitutional harms” of abusive policing.4  The New York City Police 
Department responded with a plan to issue 18,000 body cameras by the end 
of 2018,5 and New York’s mayor “promised to expand the program to all 
 
 1. Howard M. Wasserman, Moral Panics and Body Cameras, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 831, 
831–32 (2015). 
 2. Id. at 832–33 (citations omitted); see also Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 
CALIF. L. REV. 391, 396 (2016) (describing the use of police body cameras as “a practice 
hailed of late by scholars, politicians, and activists alike”). 
 3. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 4. Id.; accord Leadholm v. City of Commerce City, No. 16-cv-02786-MEH, 2017 WL 
1862313, at *3 (D. Colo. May 9, 2017) (noting that the implementation of body cameras may 
assist victims of police civil rights violations). 
 5. Gina Cherelus, New York City Says Accelerating Rollout of Police Body Cameras, 
REUTERS (Jan. 30, 2018, 6:38 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-new-york-
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patrol officers by 2019.”6  Similar progress outfitting police officers with 
body cameras can be found across the nation.7 
The consensus is that body cameras will have a positive impact on 
policing.8  Yet, the speed with which proponents embraced and implemented 
the technology left a number of ancillary issues unresolved.9  Key among 
these are the ways in which body camera evidence will be used outside the 
police-accountability context.  While body cameras are generally 
conceptualized as a check on police power, they also present a rich 
opportunity for police officers to generate evidence in criminal 
prosecutions.10  As body cameras become a routine part of a police officer’s 
equipment, video from those cameras will become virtually ubiquitous at 
trial.11  And as knowledgeable consumers of the criminal justice system, 
police officers may be tempted to shape that evidence as arrests and cases 
unfold.  Early signs of this can already be seen in an episode in Baltimore 
where police officers were accused of staging drug discoveries for their body 
cameras.12  Another way police officers can generate evidence is by narrating 
their activities and observations to highlight (or fabricate) incriminating 
events for a future audience.  A cagey police officer with some knowledge of 
the evidence rules may seize the opportunity provided by a body camera to 
provide a contemporaneous narration of events leading to an arrest as a 
substitute for an inconvenient court appearance and generally unpleasant 
cross-examination.  And, in fact, there are already reports that “officers have 
been trained to narrate events when they are being recorded.”13 
 
bodycameras/new-york-city-says-accelerating-rollout-of-police-body-cameras-
idUSKBN1FJ34X [https://perma.cc/P772-NP2L]. 
 6. Ashley Southall, Do Body Cameras Help Policing?  1,200 New York Officers Aim to 
Find Out, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/26/nyregion/do-
body-cameras-help-policing-1200-new-york-officers-aim-to-find-out.html [https://perma.cc/ 
6WJW-R86B]. 
 7. See Jocelyn Simonson, Beyond Body Cameras:  Defending a Robust Right to Record 
the Police, 104 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1565 (2016) (noting that at least thirty-six states have proposed 
some form of legislation involving “police-worn cameras”). 
 8. See, e.g., supra notes 2–4. 
 9. For a summary of the policy issues implicated by the sudden prominence of body 
cameras, see Richard E. Myers II, Police-Generated Digital Video:  Five Key Questions, 
Multiple Audiences, and a Range of Answers, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1237, 1253–64 (2018). 
 10. See, e.g., State v. Plevell, 889 N.W.2d 584, 587 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (“A compact 
disc containing body camera videos from the officers who responded to the 911 call and 
attempted to resuscitate the woman was played for the grand jury.”). 
 11. For early examples, see United States v. Groah, No. C 17-00198 WHA, 2017 WL 
6350283, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2017) (excluding a police officer’s statements on body 
camera video on hearsay grounds); Greer v. City of Hayward, 229 F. Supp. 3d 1091, 1094 n.3 
(N.D. Cal. 2017) (same); State v. Paoli, No. 44038, 2017 WL 361153, at *3 (Idaho Ct. App. 
Jan. 25, 2017) (rejecting a challenge to the admissibility of hearsay statements contained in 
police body camera video admitted as excited utterances in a domestic violence prosecution); 
People v. Albertson, No. 4-15-0873, 2018 WL 2392858, at *1–2 (Ill. App. Ct. May 24, 2018) 
(reviewing a similar objection). 
 12. See Evan Simko-Bednarski, Bodycam Footage Raises Questions in Baltimore Case, 
CNN (Aug. 25, 2017, 5:48 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/25/us/baltimore-police-body-
camera-footage/index.html [https://perma.cc/PJ5L-8MNL]. 
 13. NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, POLICING BODY CAMERAS 22–23 (2017). 
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This leads to a thorny question that courts have yet to answer and that 
scholars have largely ignored:  whether police officer statements captured on 
a body camera (“police body camera statements”) are admissible in court.14  
Litigants focused on the events portrayed in body camera video can easily 
overlook the admissibility of accompanying statements.  Yet a statement 
captured on a body camera that describes some relevant occurrence—for 
example, “he is reaching for his pocket” or “your breath smells like 
alcohol”—should draw a hearsay objection because it is an out-of-court 
statement introduced (presumably) to prove the asserted fact—that is, to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted.15  To overcome the objection, the 
proponent of such statements will need to either identify a nonhearsay 
purpose or point to an applicable hearsay exception.16  And since nonhearsay 
purposes for a police officer’s statements about a suspect’s incriminating 
activities are unlikely to materialize (outside of the police-accountability 
context),17 the potential applicability of a hearsay exception becomes critical.  
This is especially true in scenarios where a police officer’s statement—for 
example, “he just tossed a gun”—narrates an occurrence that is not captured 
on the video and thus constitutes a critical piece of evidence against the 
accused. 
The admissibility of police body camera statements hinges on how courts 
unpack an unresolved tension in evidence law.  Statements made 
contemporaneously with litigated events are generally admissible through a 
variety of hearsay exceptions.18  For example, if a passerby sees a man 
 
 14. Apart from the benefits of such cameras, scholars focus on privacy concerns and the 
logistics of discovery. See generally Marc Jonathan Blitz, Police Body-Worn Cameras:  
Evidentiary Benefits and Privacy Threats, 9 ADVANCE 43 (2015); Mary D. Fan, Privacy, 
Public Disclosure, Police Body Cameras:  Policy Splits, 68 ALA. L. REV. 395 (2016); Kelly 
Freund, Note, When Cameras Are Rolling:  Privacy Implications of Body-Mounted Cameras 
on Police, 49 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 91 (2015); V. Noah Gimbel, Note, Body Cameras 
and Criminal Discovery, 104 GEO. L.J. 1581 (2016); Richard Lin, Note, Police Body Worn 
Cameras and Privacy:  Retaining Benefits While Reducing Public Concerns, 14 DUKE L. & 
TECH. REV. 346 (2016); Ethan Thomas, Note, The Privacy Case for Body Cameras:  The Need 
for a Privacy-Centric Approach to Body Camera Policymaking, 50 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 191 (2017).  For further discussion, see also Myers, supra note 9, at 1254 
(“Confrontation Clause requirements may limit the use of recordings.  Hearsay limitations 
might require special instructions or redaction.”). 
 15. Hearsay is defined as a statement offered “to prove the truth of the matter asserted in 
the statement.” FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(2). 
 16. See 30B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & JEFFREY BELLIN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 6712 (2017). 
 17. This Article focuses on the use of video footage outside the police-accountability 
context.  In cases against police officers, police statements about suspect activities may be 
relevant for the nonhearsay purpose of establishing the officer’s state of mind.  This will rarely 
be true in cases against civilians. See id. § 6720 (explaining the abuse of the nonhearsay 
purpose of showing the course of investigation); id. § 6833 (emphasizing the nonexistent 
relevance of most statements offered to show a speaker’s state of mind).  Another viable 
nonhearsay purpose in both contexts will be criminal defense use of police body camera 
statements to impeach contrary police officer testimony.  When a speaker’s own out-of-court 
statements are used to impeach a speaker, the statements are introduced for a nonhearsay 
purpose; they are relevant regardless of their truth. Id. § 7051. 
 18. See infra Part III. 
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walking into a bank with a rifle, the passerby’s exclamation to a 
companion—such as, “he’s got a gun!”—would be admissible at trial as an 
excited utterance or present sense impression.19  Yet, an official narration of 
a crime or investigation, such as would be found in a police report, typically 
cannot be introduced against a defendant in a criminal case.20  Thus, a police 
officer’s report on the same event that contained similar language—for 
example, “the suspect walked into the bank with a gun”—would just as 
clearly be inadmissible hearsay.  Body cameras present the courts with the 
dilemma of reconciling these two scenarios.  Is “he’s got a gun” admissible 
against a defendant even when the observer is a police officer who includes 
that narration in an official police record generated by the police officer’s 
body camera? 
To answer this question, courts must reconcile a series of inconsistent 
evidence rules, ambiguous congressional intent, and an overriding 
constitutional provision.  The guidance that results is that police officers’ out-
of-court statements captured in body camera video can be introduced as 
substantive evidence against a criminal defendant if the statements qualify 
for admission under certain hearsay exceptions, such as the present sense 
impression, excited utterance, or recorded recollection exceptions; and either 
(1) the statements are “nontestimonial”;21 or (2) the police officer who made 
the out-of-court statement testifies.  Although courts have so far stumbled in 
this context, this conclusion resolves the tensions described above.  
Specifically, it reconciles a series of conflicting evidence rules, untangles 
ambiguous congressional intent, enforces constitutional principles, and 
facilitates the admission of reliable evidence.  Thus, this Article is not another 
dire warning about the incompatibility of aging evidence rules and new 
technology.  Instead, this is a feel-good tale about how normative concerns 
about police-generated evidence map relatively well into an existing 
evidentiary framework.  All that is required is for courts, litigants, and 
scholars to see through the evidentiary thicket to a refreshingly elegant 
resolution provided by existing evidentiary and constitutional doctrine. 
I.  BODY CAMERAS IN MODERN POLICING:  THE IMPETUS 
AND THE IMPLICATIONS 
“Police body cameras are compact devices that can create both audio and 
visual records of police officer actions, observations, and interactions with 
the public.”22  The cameras are small and versatile enough to be worn almost 
 
 19. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1)–(2). 
 20. See id. r. 803(8); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004) (explaining that the 
Confrontation Clause requires the opportunity for cross-examination of testimonial hearsay). 
 21. For purposes of Confrontation Clause analysis, the U.S. Supreme Court has defined 
“nontestimonial” as a statement “not made with the primary purpose of creating evidence 
for . . . prosecution.” Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2181 (2015). 
 22. Dru S. Letourneau, Note, Police Body Cameras:  Implementation with Caution, 
Forethought, and Policy, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 439, 442 (2015); see also NAT’L INST. OF 
JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A PRIMER ON BODY-WORN CAMERAS FOR LAW 
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anywhere on a police officer’s person.23  Like badges, firearms, or radios, 
these miniature devices are becoming an essential part of the modern police 
officer’s gear.24  Notably, the rise of body cameras is not without precedent.  
Another recording device, the dashboard camera (“dash cam”), provides a 
rough historical precursor.  The history of dash cams in policing and the use 
of that video in criminal prosecutions can inform the likely treatment of body 
camera evidence. 
Prior to 1980, there were few, if any, dash cams in police patrol cars.25  
Around that time, police departments began installing dash cams to help 
secure drunk-driving convictions.26  A second, more powerful, impetus for 
dash cams came in the 1990s over concerns about racial bias and profiling.27  
At least in limited circumstances, dash cams could promote police 
accountability.28  The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), through its In-Car Camera 
Initiative Program, contributed the first funds for state agencies to acquire 
dash cams in 2000.29  That year, only 11 percent of state police vehicles used 
the technology.30  By 2003, 72 percent did.31 
The “body camera revolution”32 or “body camera bonanza”33 seems to be 
following the dash cam trajectory.  The Police Executive Research Forum, in 
conjunction with COPS, conducted a survey in July 2013 that revealed that 
 
ENFORCEMENT 5 (2012) (describing body cameras as “mobile audio and video capture devices 
that allow officers to record what they see and hear”). 
 23. Mary D. Fan, Justice Visualized:  Courts and the Body Camera Revolution, 50 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 897, 901 (2017) (describing police body cameras as “[s]mall enough to be worn 
on the head, ear, or chest”); see also NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 5 (noting that 
body cameras “can be attached to various body areas, including the head, by helmet, glasses 
or other means, or to the body by pocket, badge or other means of attachment”). 
 24. See, e.g., Devin Coldewey, Cop Watch:  Who Benefits When Law Enforcement Gets 
Body Cams?, NBC NEWS (Aug. 17, 2013, 11:08 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/technology/ 
cop-watch-who-benefits-when-law-enforcement-gets-body-cams-6C10911746 
[https://perma.cc/Y7U7-M662]; Peter Hermann & Rachel Weiner, Issues over Police 
Shooting in Ferguson Lead Push for Officers and Body Cameras, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/issues-over-police-shooting-in-ferguson-lead-
push-for-officers-and-body-cameras/2014/12/02/dedcb2d8-7a58-11e4-84d4-
7c896b90abdc_story.html [https://perma.cc/793J-FJHY] (stating that body cameras will 
become “standard police equipment”); Dave Lucas, NY AG Announces Program to Provide 
Funding for Police Body Cameras, WAMC (July 30, 2018), http://www.wamc.org/post/ny-
ag-announces-program-provide-funding-police-body-cameras [http://perma.cc/HQ62-HZN2] 
(“The devices have become standard issue in many police departments.”). 
 25. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, THE IMPACT OF VIDEO EVIDENCE ON MODERN 
POLICING 5 (2004). 
 26. Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) advocated for the use of video cameras to 
preserve evidence of police officer encounters with drunk drivers to improve the likelihood of 
convictions. Id. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See id. 
 29. Id. at 5–6. 
 30. Id. at 6. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Fan, supra note 23, at 898. 
 33. Caren Myers Morrison, Body Camera Obscura:  The Semiotics of Police Video, 54 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 791, 791 (2017). 
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fewer than 25 percent of responding law enforcement agencies used body 
cameras.34  That changed dramatically following the August 2014 shooting 
of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri.  The resulting public outcry, 
amplified by the rallying cry “Black Lives Matter,” marked the starting point 
of the body camera revolution.35  In 2014, President Barack Obama proposed 
a $263 million spending package to increase the use of body cameras, which 
included a $75 million package to aid local governments with 
implementation costs.36  In 2015, the DOJ announced the $20 million Body-
Worn Camera Pilot Partnership Program as part of a $75 million investment 
in law enforcement agencies.37  Not to be left out, in April 2017, Axon 
(formerly TASER) offered all interested police agencies free cameras for a 
year.38 
These actions are having an impact.  A 2015 survey conducted by the 
Major Cities Chiefs’ Association and the Major County Sheriffs’ Association 
indicated that approximately 95 percent of law enforcement agencies 
surveyed already employed or were committed to employing body cameras 
in the near future.39  By 2016, thirty-five of the seventy largest U.S. cities 
had begun using or had committed to using body cameras.40  As of November 
2017, thirty-four states have enacted laws regarding the use of body 
cameras.41 
The critical difference between dash cams and body cameras is the scope 
of coverage.  Dash cams cover only a limited area of view—directly in front 
of a police car—and typically only come into play in cases that arise out of 
 
 34. POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN CAMERA PROGRAM:  
RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 2 (2014). 
 35. See Seth W. Stoughton, Police Body-Worn Cameras, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1363, 1364 
(2018) (noting that the usefulness of body cameras “was popularized in the aftermath of . . . 
[the] fatal shooting of Michael Brown”); Wasserman, supra note 1, at 831–32 (“[O]ne 
significant policy suggestion has emerged from the [Michael Brown shooting]:  equipping 
police officers with body cameras.”); Herstory, BLACK LIVES MATTER, 
https://blacklivesmatter.com/about/herstory [https://perma.cc/PHC8-6RF5] (last visited Feb. 
12, 2019) (connecting the start of the Black Lives Matter movement to the shooting of Michael 
Brown). 
 36. Associated Press, Police Need Body Cameras to Build Trust with Public, Obama Says, 
NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE (Dec. 1, 2014, 1:46 PM), http://www.nola.com/crime/ 
index.ssf/2014/12/obama_police_body_cameras.html [https://perma.cc/Z7ND-KSQ7]. 
 37. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces $20 Million in 
Funding to Support Body-Worn Camera Pilot Program (May 1, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-20-million-funding-support-
body-worn-camera-pilot-program [https://perma.cc/N8YG-856S]. 
 38. Josh Sanburn, The Company That Makes Tasers Is Giving Free Body Cameras to 
Police, TIME (Apr. 5, 2017), http://time.com/4726775/axon-taser-free-body-cameras-police 
[https://perma.cc/E7GE-7YCT]. 
 39. MAJOR CITIES CHIEFS & MAJOR CTY. SHERIFFS, SURVEY OF TECHNOLOGY NEEDS—
BODY WORN CAMERAS ii (2015).  The survey population consisted of sixty-seven major cities 
and seventy-six major counties. Id. at 1. 
 40. Stoughton, supra note 35, at 1366. 
 41. Alison Lawrence, What Does the Latest Research Say About Body-Worn Cameras?, 
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES BLOG (Nov. 20, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/blog/2017/11/20/ 
what-does-the-latest-research-say-about-body-worn-cameras.aspx [https://perma.cc/SRV5-
6EWT]. 
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traffic stops.  Further, only a subset of police vehicles are equipped with dash 
cams.  This means that dash cams capture only a small percentage of citizen-
police encounters.  By contrast, body cameras are small and mobile, which 
allows them to go places dash cams cannot.42  With saturation of the patrol 
force, body cameras will capture a substantial percentage of coercive citizen-
police interactions. 
Body cameras have been touted as the gold standard in ensuring police 
accountability and building public trust,43 and they have garnered support at 
every level.44  The focus of the effort is to ensure police accountability.  At 
the same time, a prominent role for body camera video in criminal 
prosecutions outside the police-accountability context is inevitable.  As one 
recent article warns:  “Law enforcement has certainly become their main 
function, as they’re used more and more to identify suspects and provide 
evidence for the prosecution.”45 
Understandably, scholars and the media have focused on the role of body 
camera video in holding police officers accountable for unlawful shootings 
and other uses of excessive force.  Scholars have also highlighted privacy 
concerns generated by body camera video that is made publicly available46 
and the discovery obligations that are created when the government 
monopolizes access to the video.47  Recognizing that there is no question that 
video evidence of relevant events will be admitted at trial, scholars interested 
in evidentiary implications have warned about the potential unreliability of 
seemingly unimpeachable video.48  Largely ignored is the question of 
whether and to what extent the audio tracks that accompany body camera 
videos, and specifically police body camera statements, are admissible 
against a defendant in a criminal prosecution.  Part II takes up that 
surprisingly complex question. 
II.  THE ADMISSIBILITY OF POLICE BODY CAMERA STATEMENTS 
Police body camera statements will often constitute powerful evidence.  
For example, a police officer may state on the video that a person stopped for 
 
 42. See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 5 (noting that body cameras “have the 
capability to record officer interactions that previously could only be captured by in-car or 
interrogation room camera systems”). 
 43. See, e.g., Fan, supra note 23, at 953 (noting that the focus of body cameras is “to 
rebuild public trust and demonstrate police accountability”); Stoughton, supra note 35, at 1366 
(noting that body cameras are deemed to serve two ends:  “greater police accountability and 
improvement[] in police-community relations”); Associated Press, supra note 36 (noting that 
the White House stated that body cameras “could help bridge deep mistrust between law 
enforcement and the public”). 
 44. Wasserman, supra note 1, at 832–33. 
 45. Martin Kaste, Should the Police Control Their Own Body Camera Footage?, NPR 
(May 25, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/05/25/529905669/should-the-police-
control-their-own-body-camera-footage [https://perma.cc/CZH4-YA9K]. 
 46. Mark Tunick, Regulating Public Access to Body Camera Footage:  Response to Iesha 
S. Nunes, “Hands Up, Don’t Shoot,” 67 FLA. L. REV. F. 143, 146–50 (2016). 
 47. See, e.g., Simonson, supra note 7, at 1567–68, 1574–75. 
 48. See, e.g., Morrison, supra note 33, at 796; Stoughton, supra note 35, at 1378; Tunick, 
supra note 46, at 144–46. 
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drunk driving smells like alcohol or was swerving all over the road; a fleeing 
drug-crime suspect discarded something in the bushes; an arrestee reached 
for his pocket; a suspected conspirator signaled to an associate; or an arrestee 
just waived his Miranda rights.  The possibilities are as varied as the factual 
scenarios that populate the criminal courts.  In almost all such circumstances, 
however, these statements constitute hearsay because they are out-of-court 
statements offered at a later proceeding for the truth of the matter asserted in 
the statement.49  Evidence rules generally bar hearsay, even if the statement’s 
author (i.e., the declarant) testifies.50  The theory behind the prohibition is 
that important disputes should be resolved through adversarial questioning 
of live witnesses recounting, in the presence of the fact finder, what occurred.  
Consequently, evidence rules discourage unsworn, out-of-court statements 
that can be introduced without “cross-examination, the ‘greatest legal engine 
ever invented for the discovery of truth.’”51 
The hearsay prohibition, however, is not absolute.  A hearsay statement 
becomes admissible as substantive evidence if it falls within one of the many 
hearsay exceptions.52  Statements captured on body camera videos, like those 
described above, will potentially be eligible for admission under a number of 
exceptions.  Primarily, police body camera statements could be admitted 
under the recorded recollection,53 excited utterance,54 or present sense 
impression55 exceptions. 
A.  Recorded Recollections 
Recorded recollections are the most straightforward example of how 
police officer statements captured in body camera video may be admissible.  
The recorded recollection56 hearsay exception permits out-of-court 
statements to be introduced as substantive evidence on the theory that a 
witness’s recollection of events at an earlier time will be more reliable than 
the same witness’s later testimony from a fading memory.57  The exception, 
however, is narrow.  It allows the introduction of “[a] record that:  (A) is on 
a matter the witness once knew about but now cannot recall well enough to 
testify fully and accurately; (B) was made or adopted by the witness when 
the matter was fresh in the witness’s memory; and (C) accurately reflects the 
witness’s knowledge.”58  Importantly, the recorded recollection exception 
requires the declarant who made the recorded out-of-court statement to 
 
 49. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(2). 
 50. Id. r. 802. 
 51. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 
§ 1367 (3d ed. 1940)). 
 52. See FED. R. EVID. 802. 
 53. Id. r. 803(5). 
 54. Id. r. 803(2). 
 55. Id. r. 803(1). 
 56. See id. r. 803(5). 
 57. Id. r. 803(5) advisory committee’s notes on proposed rules (Exception (5)) (“The 
guarantee of trustworthiness is found in the reliability inherent in a record made while events 
were still fresh in mind and accurately reflecting them.”). 
 58. Id. r. 803(5). 
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testify.59  In the present context, this means that if a police officer testifies to 
memory failure regarding a detail that the police officer earlier referenced on 
video, the exception permits the introduction of the police officer’s out-of-
court body camera statement.  For example, if a police officer relayed the 
reason he stopped a motorist (e.g., “you were swerving all over the road”) on 
a video, but could not recall the reason for the stop at a later hearing, the 
prosecution could introduce the police officer’s out-of-court statement as a 
recorded recollection.  The exception’s application is both clear and narrow:  
the recorded recollection exception only applies if the officer-declarant 
testifies,60 vouches for the accuracy of the out-of-court statement during that 
testimony61 (e.g., “I always inform suspects accurately about why I stopped 
them”), and testifies to a present memory failing.62  In addition, the exception 
typically does not allow the statement itself to be introduced into evidence 
but only read into the record.63  This caveat is intended to prevent the jury 
from giving recorded recollections greater weight than other testimony.64  
The requirement is easily accommodated for oral or written statements, 
which can be read to the jury but not physically provided to them.  For videos, 
this requirement becomes somewhat unwieldy.  The most faithful application 
would be playing the police body camera statement during the witness’s 
testimony but not permitting the recording to be admitted into evidence as an 
exhibit.65 
 
 59. Id. r. 803(5) advisory committee’s notes on proposed rules (Exception (5)); 
30B WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 16, § 6853. 
 60. FED. R. EVID. 803(5) advisory committee’s notes on proposed rules (Exception (5)) 
(recognizing that because the declarant must testify for the exception to apply, “the 
unavailability requirement of the exception is of a limited and peculiar nature”); see United 
States v. Porter, 986 F.2d 1014, 1017 (6th Cir. 1993) (“While Rule 803(5) treats recorded 
recollection as an exception to the hearsay rule, the hearsay is not of a particularly unreliable 
genre.  This is because the out-of-court declarant is actually on the witness stand and subject 
to evaluation by the finder of fact.”). 
 61. See United States v. Mornan, 413 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005) (rejecting the 
admission of evidence under Rule 803(5) where the witness “could not attest to the accuracy 
of her statement during her current testimony”); Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410, 416 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1998) (“[T]he witness may testify that she presently remembers recording the fact 
correctly or remembers recognizing the writing as accurate when she read it at an earlier time.  
But if her present memory is less effective, it is sufficient if the witness testifies that she knows 
the memorandum is correct because of a habit or practice to record matters accurately or to 
check them for accuracy.  At the extreme, it is even sufficient if the individual testifies to 
recognizing her signature on the statement and believes the statement is correct because she 
would not have signed it if she had not believed it true at the time.  However, the witness must 
acknowledge at trial the accuracy of the statement.” (citations omitted)). 
 62. FED. R. EVID. 803(5)(A). 
 63. Id. r. 803(5) (“If admitted, the record may be read into evidence but may be received 
as an exhibit only if offered by an adverse party.”); see also 30B WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra 
note 16, § 6857. 
 64. 30B WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 16, § 6857. 
 65. This would mean that if the jury will actually receive the video as an exhibit for other 
purposes, such as to visually illustrate the incident, statements admitted only as recorded 
recollections would need to be redacted. See id. (“In such circumstances, the [requirement] 
should be taken to mean that the pertinent portions of the video or audio recording can be 
played for the jury during trial, but not taken back to the jury room.  If the jury, thereafter 
requests to view the video or hear the audio, a court could rely on Rule 803(5) to refer the 
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B.  Excited Utterances 
Excited utterances provide another straightforward example of a 
mechanism for introducing police body camera statements at trial.  The 
Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE), like their state analogues, define excited 
utterances as “statement[s] relating to a startling event or condition, made 
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.”66  The 
exception “rests on the theory that the agitated mind is much less likely to 
engage in conscious fabrication than the reflective mind.”67  Or, as the 
Advisory Committee explains:  “circumstances may produce a condition of 
excitement which temporarily stills the capacity of reflection and produces 
utterances free of conscious fabrication.”68  As one of the authors of this 
Article has explained: 
The key identifying feature of excited utterances is the emotional mindset 
of the declarant.  To qualify for admission under Federal Rule of Evidence 
803(2), an out-of-court statement must be uttered “while the declarant was 
under the stress of excitement” generated by the described event or 
condition.  This typically entails a foundational inquiry into the speaker’s 
tone of voice and demeanor.  Other factors include, “timing, age of the 
declarant, characteristics of the event, and the subject matter of the 
statements.”  These factors are designed to get at the critical underlying 
question of whether and to what degree the event spoken of by the declarant 
was, at that time, generating an emotional response.69 
Given the nature of police-citizen interactions, statements of civilians 
captured on body camera videos will frequently qualify as excited utterances.  
An important limitation arises, however, with respect to statements by police 
officers.  The excited utterance exception hinges on an assessment of the out-
of-court speaker’s excitement level.70  This means that statements of trained, 
experienced police officers will be less likely to qualify for admission under 
the excited utterance exception than analogous statements made by civilians.  
For statements by police officers, only the most stressful events (e.g., an 
officer-involved shooting or grisly traffic accident) will likely generate a 
sufficient emotional reaction or, more precisely, foundational evidence of 
such a reaction to trigger the exception.  Statements by police officers 
 
jurors to the court reporter’s transcript (assuming it records the pertinent statements).  This 
would ensure that, consistent with the intent of the rule, the recorded recollection is not 
prioritized in the jurors’ minds over the live testimony of the same or other witnesses.”). 
 66. FED. R. EVID. 803(2); see also, e.g., ILL. R. EVID. 803(2); TEX. R. EVID. 803(2). 
 67. United States v. Ledford, 443 F.3d 702, 711 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 68. FED. R. EVID. 803(1) advisory committee’s notes on proposed rules (Exceptions (1) 
and (2)). 
 69. 30B WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 16, § 6818 (footnote omitted) (first quoting FED. 
R. EVID. 803(2); then quoting Guam v. Cepeda, 69 F.3d 369, 372 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
 70. Id. (explaining that judicial analysis of admissibility depends on the “critical 
underlying question of whether and to what degree the event spoken of by the declarant was, 
at that time, generating an emotional response”). 
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regarding routine police activities, like traffic stops or arrests, will rarely 
qualify for admission under the excited utterance exception.71 
C.  Present Sense Impressions 
Given the narrowness of the recorded recollection and excited utterance 
hearsay exceptions in this context, the most feasible exception supporting 
admission of police officer statements captured in body camera video is the 
present sense impression exception.  As explained below, the present sense 
impression exception, while nearly a century old, is tailor-made for the 
introduction of contemporaneous narration captured on body camera video.  
Its application, however, is also the most legally complex and normatively 
problematic.  Thus, treatment of this exception’s application to police body 
camera statements requires more extensive analysis.72 
The modern present sense impression exception is illustrated by Rule 
803(1).  That rule, and analogous variations in most states, creates a hearsay 
exception for “[a] statement describing or explaining an event or condition, 
made while or immediately after the declarant perceived [the event or 
condition].”73  Qualifying statements are admissible even if the declarant 
does not testify, and they do not require any showing of the speaker’s 
unavailability.74 
Despite its broad sweep, the present sense impression exception has 
generated little controversy over the years.  This is because it has been rarely 
used.75  The primary reasons for the lack of use are practical limitations, not 
legal obstacles. 
Before any litigant offers a present sense impression, such a statement 
must be “(1) uttered, (2) preserved, and (3) tactically significant to a litigated 
dispute.”76  These factors are not easy to satisfy.77  One of the authors of this 
 
 71. See United States v. Hemsher, 893 F.3d 525, 533 (8th Cir. 2018) (“The execution of 
a search warrant in the normal course of employment by trained officers does not constitute a 
startling event.”); cf. United States v. Campbell, 782 F. Supp. 1258, 1262 (N.D. Ill. 1991) 
(“Even for a police officer who presumably is trained to react in such potentially dangerous 
situations, involvement in a chase with an armed suspect would be an exciting and startling 
event.”); United States v. Obayagbona, 627 F. Supp. 329, 339 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (“The fact that 
the excited witness was a law enforcement agent does not preclude admissibility under the 
excited utterance exception.”). 
 72. One of the authors of this Article has written extensively about the present sense 
impression exception, and the discussion that follows about the exception’s origins is largely 
drawn from that work. See Jeffrey Bellin, Facebook, Twitter, and the Uncertain Future of 
Present Sense Impressions, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 331, 367–50 (2012). 
 73. FED. R. EVID. 803(1). 
 74. See, e.g., State v. Wright, 370 P.3d 1122, 1126 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016) (rejecting an 
objection to police body camera statements narrating a drug deal in progress that were offered 
as present sense impressions). 
 75. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1) advisory committee’s notes on proposed rules (Exceptions 
(1) and (2)) (“Since unexciting events are less likely to evoke comment, decisions involving 
Exception (1) are far less numerous.”). 
 76. See Bellin, supra note 72, at 347 (alteration in original) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 803(2)). 
 77. See id. 
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Article has explained this in a general context by contrasting the present 
sense impression and excited utterance exceptions to illuminate the point: 
The excited utterance exception applies if a speaker makes a statement 
relating to a “startling” event while “under the stress of [the resulting] 
excitement.”  As a practical matter, startling events and excited utterances 
frequently coexist.  If a witness (a bystander, participant, or victim) is 
present, a startling event will invariably trigger excited statements intended 
for a broad audience:  “Stop, thief!”; “An assassin shot the Vice President!”  
Due to their association with an often significant event, excited utterances 
are also likely to be preserved in the memories of others or documented (for 
example, by police responding to a crime scene).78 
Present sense impressions possess none of these advantages.  
Contemporaneous observations are less likely to be uttered about nonexciting 
events, and when they are, they are less likely to be remembered or 
preserved.79  Thanks to social media and text messaging, this is changing.  
Social media posts and text messages often recount unexciting events 
(unfortunately for us all!) and do so in a manner that leaves consumers of the 
posts with little ability to corroborate the initial observation.80  But social 
media and text messaging are relatively recent phenomena.  As a result, until 
recent years, present sense impressions played little role in litigation due to 
the practical limitations described above. 
Police body cameras demolish these practical limitations.  Body camera 
video is, by its very nature, designed to be preserved.  Thus, any statements 
made by police officers during a police-citizen encounter will be available 
for later use at trial.  More importantly, police officers, aware of this fact, 
may be incentivized to narrate incriminating, even if mundane, events for a 
future audience.  This means that the present sense impression exception 
provides a ready vehicle for the creation and introduction of police body 
camera statements at trial. 
Police body camera statements fit neatly within the present sense 
impression exception’s text.  A police officer’s running narration of an 
encounter, including comments like “the suspect is reaching for his 
waistband” or “the suspect threw a gun as he began to run away,” at least on 
their face, “describ[e] or explain[] an event or condition, made while or 
immediately after the declarant perceived [the event or condition].”81 
While certainly not contemplated by the drafters of the present sense 
impression exception, police body camera statements also fit within the 
exception’s rationale.  The present sense impression exception rests on an 
assumption “that contemporaneity ensures reliability.”82  Statements that 
qualify under the exception are assumed to be both accurate and sincere.  The 
statements are accurate because the closeness in time between the perceived 
 
 78. Id. at 347–48. 
 79. See id. at 348–49. 
 80. See id. at 347. 
 81. FED. R. EVID. 803(1). 
 82. United States v. Green, 556 F.3d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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event and the declarant’s verbal description eliminate dangers of faulty 
memory.83  The statements are thought to be sincere because the absence of 
time for reflection “negative[s] the likelihood of deliberate or conscious 
misrepresentation.”84 
Police body camera statements also bring the added reliability benefit of 
corroboration, something touted by the earliest proponents of the present 
sense impression exception.85  Commentary urging the American courts to 
adopt a hearsay exception for present sense impressions dates back to the 
nineteenth century.86  An 1881 article by James Bradley Thayer, the 
“granddaddy of the modern present sense impression,”87 explained that a 
present sense impression relates “what was then present or but just gone by, 
and so was open, either immediately or in the indications of it, to the 
observation of the witness who testifies to the declaration, and who can be 
cross-examined as to these indications.”88  Prominent scholars echoed these 
views, opining that because “the person who heard the declaration [would 
surely be] on hand to be cross-examined,” the present sense impression 
exception constituted “an ideal exception to the hearsay rule.”89 
The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence cite these scholars in the 
Advisory Committee Notes (“Notes”) that accompanied the adoption of the 
present sense impression exception and explicitly endorsed their rationales.90  
The Rule requires that a qualifying statement be made contemporaneously 
with the event described and assumes (like Thayer, Morgan, and the other 
commentators) that some measure of corroboration would typically follow 
from that requirement.91  The Notes make this assumption explicit by 
highlighting the (presumed) inevitability of corroboration:  “Moreover, if the 
witness is the declarant, he may be examined on the statement.  If the witness 
is not the declarant, he may be examined as to the circumstances as an aid in 
evaluating the statement.”92  This critical assumption that present sense 
 
 83. 30B WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 16, § 6812. 
 84. FED. R. EVID. 803(1) advisory committee’s notes on proposed rules (Exceptions (1) 
and (2)). 
 85. For a related example of the added benefits provided by videos, see State v. Plevell, 
889 N.W.2d 584, 589 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (relying on body camera video to determine that 
“the boyfriend does not appear to be under stress caused by the event” and that therefore his 
statements did not qualify for admission as excited utterances). 
 86. See Bellin, supra note 72, at 341. 
 87. Aviva Orenstein, Sex, Threats, and Absent Victims:  The Lessons of Regina v. 
Bedingfield for Modern Confrontation and Domestic Violence Cases, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 
115, 133 (2010). 
 88. James B. Thayer, Bedingfield’s Case—Declarations as a Part of the Res Gesta, 15 
AM. L. REV. 71, 107 (1881); see also Edmund M. Morgan, A Suggested Classification of 
Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 YALE L.J. 229, 236 (1922) (expressing the same 
sentiment). 
 89. Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence, 
28 COLUM. L. REV. 432, 439 (1928). 
 90. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1) advisory committee’s notes on proposed rules (Exceptions 
(1) and (2)). 
 91. See Bellin, supra note 72, at 348–49. 
 92. FED. R. EVID. 803(1) advisory committee’s notes on proposed rules (Exceptions (1) 
and (2)). 
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impressions will be accompanied by some measure of corroboration holds 
for statements captured in body camera video. 
Unlike modern present sense impressions found in text messages and 
social media posts, statements captured in body camera video bring some of 
the same corroboration guarantees that were originally thought to undergird 
the present sense impression exception.  Police body camera statements can 
be admitted with the police officer’s testimony—thus allowing “the declarant 
[to] be examined on the statement.”93  And more importantly, even if the 
police officer does not testify, the statements will be introduced through the 
video itself, which can “be examined as to the circumstances as an aid in 
evaluating the statement.”94  Thus, even if the officer-declarant does not 
testify, the fact finder will typically see a version of what the speaker 
observed (and could plausibly observe) when the statement was made.  This 
will impart information about the police officer’s ability to observe the 
described event, and the precise things described.  To the extent the described 
event is not observable on the video, that fact will be ammunition for the 
evidence’s opponent.  In sum, the present sense impression exception will 
serve as a ready vehicle to admit statements narrated contemporaneously 
with body camera video.  As a result, police body camera statements have 
powerful evidentiary implications both for and against criminal defendants.  
But this is not the end of the story.  Part III explores the significant obstacles 
to admission of police body camera statements—even if those statements fit 
within a hearsay exception. 
III.  OBSTACLES TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF POLICE BODY CAMERA 
STATEMENTS 
This Article has thus far illustrated the ready pathway to admissibility for 
police body camera statements.  The examples provided, however, raise 
normative concerns that counsel caution when admitting police body camera 
statements against a criminal defendant.  Of course, if those concerns do not 
map onto the evidence rules, they can serve only as arguments to 
policymakers to change the rules.  However, to the degree these concerns are 
captured in evidence rules and doctrine they can be given force to exclude 
problematic police body camera statements.  This Part provides a brief 
summary of the normative concerns and then analyzes the evidentiary rules 
that give force to those concerns. 
A.  Concerns with Using Police Body Camera Statements in Trials 
Consistent with the public clamor for rapid deployment of body cameras 
summarized in Part I, body camera video presents several benefits.  For 
instance, body cameras capture and preserve evidence for trial that would 
otherwise be unavailable or left to the well-documented vagaries of human 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
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recollection and live testimony.95  Further, body camera video evidence is 
considered “accurate and objective.”96  But the danger that juries will be 
overly swayed by information and statements captured in body camera 
videos raises serious normative concerns.  This is particularly important 
because the video produced by police body cameras will more commonly be 
used to prosecute citizens than to document their abuse at the hands of 
police.97 
As Howard Wasserman notes, body cameras are described as a “panacea; 
they are spoken of as the singularly effective solution” to police abuses 
because “[v]ideo tells us exactly what happened, [and] entirely eliminates 
the . . . ambiguity that often characterizes police-citizen encounters.”98  
However, video is not as accurate as its proponents believe.  For one, the 
final product depicted in the video is different than what actually occurred.99  
Additionally, video is susceptible to subtle manipulation at the time of its 
creation.100  These shortcomings are especially concerning in the context of 
police body cameras because the body cameras do not directly capture the 
police officer’s actions and, instead, are suspect-focused.101  This is 
important given a cognitive limitation known as “camera perspective bias,” 
which results in something known as “illusory causation,” or the tendency to 
overattribute cause based on camera focus.102  And because the body cameras 
provide viewers with only the police officer’s perspective, viewers of the 
video may subconsciously adopt not just the police officer’s perspective but 
the commentary of the police officer as well. 
Seth Stoughton highlights two cognitive biases that are relevant here:  
motivated reasoning and identity-confirmation bias.103  These can lead 
 
 95. See Stoughton, supra note 35, at 1378 (quoting Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. 
Supp. 2d 668, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)). 
 96. Id. at 1393. 
 97. Letourneau, supra note 22, at 461 (noting that unintended consequences arising from 
the assumed admissibility of body camera video evidence “could result in the degradation of 
a defendant’s right to a fair trial by redefining the entire criminal trial process”). 
 98. Wasserman, supra note 1, at 833; see also Morrison, supra note 33, at 792–94 (noting 
that the assumption that video depicts “objective truth” means, in part, that “we lack the 
ingrained, institutionalized skepticism we bring to text”); Jessica Silbey, Cross-Examining 
Film, 8 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIGION GENDER & CLASS 17, 18 (2008) (“It is typical for courts 
and advocates to naïvely treat filmic evidence as . . . a presentation of unambiguous reality.”); 
Tunick, supra note 46, at 144–45 (noting that supporters assume that body cameras are reliable 
and provide an objectively true account of reality or a “neutral third eye”). 
 99. See, e.g., Silbey, supra note 98, at 18 (“[F]ilm is a constructed medium.  The camera 
always presents a certain point of view and a frame that includes some images and excludes 
others.” (footnote omitted)); Stoughton, supra note 35, at 1405 (noting that body cameras “will 
record less, more, and differently than a human would see, all at the same time” through a 
process known as video compression). 
 100. See Tunick, supra note 46, at 145 (noting that the person who controls “where the 
camera points can manipulate their audience in subtle ways”). 
 101. Stoughton, supra note 35, at 1409–10. 
 102. Id. at 1409. 
 103. See id. at 1406.  Motivated reasoning is “defined as ‘the tendency of people to conform 
[their] assessments of information to some goal or end [other than] accuracy.’” Id. (alterations 
in original) (quoting Dan M. Kahan, Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive 
Reflection, 8 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 407, 408 (2013)). 
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viewers of the body camera video to interpret evidence in a way that 
conforms to their expectations.104  The incomplete and acontextual nature of 
video evidence facilitates this gap-filling105 because visual gaps can be 
readily filled with oral cues.  Consequently, the fact that body camera video 
evidence is elevated among other forms of evidence as more neutral and 
objective becomes especially problematic.106  This could lead juries to defer 
to the impression created by body camera video and any police officer 
statements it contains.107 
Once police officers know that body camera video evidence can either hurt 
or help them, there may be an incentive to capitalize on their initial, unilateral 
control of the video to generate favorable evidence (or suppress unfavorable 
evidence).  Police officers involved in shooting Stephon Clark muted their 
body camera audio shortly after the shooting, which drew suspicion to their 
actions.108  Similarly, in the 2016 shooting of Alton Sterling, both police 
officers’ body cameras were “dislodged.”109  Recently, allegations surfaced 
that Baltimore police officers reenacted the discovery of drug evidence for 
body cameras.110  More broadly, researchers at the American Civil Liberties 
Union found that as many as 70 percent of police officers violate body 
camera policies.111  None of this means that body camera video, or statements 
captured in that video, must be excluded from litigation.  It does suggest, 
however, that police body camera statements can be manipulated to create a 
one-sided and potentially misleading account—an account that can be 
uniquely persuasive.  This danger becomes particularly significant if police 
body camera statements are introduced at trial without the live testimony of 
the officer-declarant.  Such statements will be admitted with a veneer of 
reliability despite never having been subjected to an oath or “the crucible of 
cross-examination.”112 
All of these dangers are familiar ones to the evidence rules.  In particular, 
the rules governing hearsay are designed to restrict the admission of out-of-
court statements to only those statements that are sufficiently reliable to be 
 
 104. See id. 
 105. Morrison, supra note 33, at 801. 
 106. See Stoughton, supra note 35, at 1408, 1413 (noting that whether or not video 
evidence is superior to other forms of evidence is debatable, but the danger is that people view 
it as such despite its flaws). 
 107. See Tunick, supra note 46, at 145 (“The assumption that the camera is objective and 
captures the most reliable evidence is likely to lead a jury or judge to have nearly absolute 
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 108. Alex Horton, After Stephon Clark’s Death, New Videos Show Police Muted Body 
Cameras at Least 16 Times, WASH. POST (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
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 109. ACLU Questions Lack of Police Body Cams in Alton Sterling Shooting, CBS NEWS 
(July 6, 2016, 7:30 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/alton-sterling-baton-rouge-police-
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 110. See Simko-Bednarski, supra note 12. 
 111. Laurent Sacharoff & Sarah Lustbader, Who Should Own Police Body Camera 
Videos?, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 269, 290 (2017). 
 112. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). 
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presented to the trier of fact.  As the next sections discuss, for the most part, 
courts have the tools they need in this context.  They need only navigate those 
rules correctly, a challenge that is admittedly complicated by the overgrown 
thicket of evidence doctrine implicated by police body cameras. 
B.  The Calculated Narration “Requirement” 
The analysis of the obstacles to admission of police body camera 
statements begins with a court-created doctrine that will undoubtedly be 
applied in this context, even though it should be discarded completely.  The 
Seventh Circuit, and to a lesser degree other courts, read an additional 
requirement into the present sense impression exception that has the potential 
to exclude virtually all police body camera statements whether offered by the 
prosecution or defense.113  These courts require that a qualifying present 
sense impression be made without “calculated narration.”114  As explained 
below, however, calculated narration is an illegitimate ground of exclusion.  
Subsequent sections explain that other sources of evidence law, particularly 
the law enforcement exception to the public records hearsay exception and 
the Confrontation Clause, track similar considerations, which renders 
calculated narration redundant as well.115 
The Texas Court of Appeals applied the “calculated narration” concept in 
Fischer v. State116 to exclude police officer statements captured on a dash 
cam video. In Fischer, the court considered the admission of a police 
officer’s running narration of a drunk-driving arrest, which was recorded by 
a dash cam mounted in the police officer’s patrol car.117  The court suspected 
that the police officer had consciously created statements for use in a later 
prosecution and concluded that this disqualified the resulting statements from 
admission as present sense impressions.118  Because the police officer’s 
statements fit neatly into the text of the present sense impression exception, 
the court had to invoke the exception’s spirit (not its text) to support 
exclusion.119  On appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the 
intermediate court’s decision.120  The Court of Criminal Appeals held that 
 
 113. This discussion criticizing the calculated narration exception to the present sense 
impression hearsay exception in the body camera context tracks one of this Article’s authors’ 
analysis criticizing the exception generally. See 30B WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 16, § 6815. 
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 115. See infra Parts III.C–D. 
 116. 207 S.W.3d 846 (Tex. App. 2006), aff’d, 252 S.W.3d 375 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). 
 117. Id. at 848–49. 
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 120. Fischer v. State, 252 S.W.3d 375, 376 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008), aff’g 207 S.W.3d 846 
(Tex. App. 2006). 
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the statements were “calculated statements”—a veritable “speaking offense 
report”—inadmissible under the hearsay rules.121 
Predictably, other courts disagree.  In State v. Blubaugh,122 the Utah Court 
of Appeals held that police officer statements captured on a video of the 
defendant’s home were admissible under the present sense impression 
exception because the police officer’s narrative was contemporaneous with 
his perceptions.123  Similarly, in United States v. Rideout,124 the Fourth 
Circuit found narrations by a police officer on hours of video recorded for 
investigative purposes admissible under the present sense impression 
exception.125  Neither case viewed the calculated nature of the statements as 
disqualifying. 
The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Woods126 applied the calculated 
narration gloss in a closely related context to separate out the portions of a 
confidential informant’s narration of events on a recorded audio transmission 
which were admissible under the present sense impression exception.127  The 
court explained that: 
Parts of Davis’ narratives are simple descriptions of events as they 
occurred, which meet the requirements of the rule.  However, some of the 
narrative statements are clearly addressed to the FBI agents listening in via 
the microphone.  These statements were made for the benefit of the 
agents—i.e., were calculated and provided for a reason—and are not 
admissible under the present sense impression exception.128 
This analysis tracks Fischer in the sense that the court is attempting to 
distinguish between presumably reflexive statements that are admissible 
under the present sense impression exception and calculated statements made 
for a reason that are not admissible. 
There are two problems with relying on the calculated narration concept 
to screen police body camera statements for admissibility.129  First, the 
concept is without support in the evidence rules.  The absence of “calculated 
narration” is not a requirement of the present sense impression exception, an 
interpretation of any language in that rule, or an attempt to implement the 
intent of its drafters.  It is a judicial supplement to an otherwise clear rule.  
The Seventh Circuit candidly acknowledges this, stating:  “In determining 
 
 121. Id. at 376, 381; see also Eggert v. State, 395 S.W.3d 240, 243 (Tex. App. 2012) 
(describing the police officer’s “calculated narrative” as a “speaking offense report”). 
 122. 904 P.2d 688 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
 123. Id. at 700 (ruling that the police officer’s narrative on a recorded videotape of the 
defendant’s home “was made while perceiving defendant’s home” and so “was admissible 
hearsay” under the present sense impression exception). 
 124. 80 F. App’x 836 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1116 (2005). 
 125. Id. at 843 (rejecting the challenge to a police officer’s contemporaneous narration of 
a videotape admitted as a present sense impression). 
 126. 301 F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 127. Id. at 559. 
 128. Id. at 562 (citation omitted). 
 129. One of the authors of this Article recently criticized “calculated narration” doctrine in 
a treatise volume. See 30B WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 16, § 6815.  Some of the following 
discussion is drawn from that criticism. 
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whether a statement meets the conditions of Rule 803[(1)], we have sought 
to determine, in addition to the predicates listed in the rule, if the statement 
was made without ‘calculated narration.’”130  This candor is refreshing, but 
hints at the doctrine’s fatal illegitimacy. 
Concededly, the roots of the calculated narration requirement can be found 
in the present sense impression exception’s common-law heritage.  In 
Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis,131 cited in the Notes accompanying Rule 
803(1),132 a Texas court noted that the hearsay statement under consideration 
was reliable because it was “sufficiently spontaneous to save it from the 
suspicion of being manufactured evidence,” and thus “[t]here was no time 
for a calculated statement.”133  But to the extent the Advisory Committee 
incorporated this amorphous sentiment into the present sense impression 
exception, it did so by including a strict timing requirement.  The Committee 
explained that “substantial contemporaneity of event and statement negative 
the likelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation.”134  Full stop.  
As for Houston Oxygen, the Committee spent a grand total of two words on 
the case and never suggested it had incorporated all of its asides into the 
rule.135  There is no suggestion in the text of the present sense impression 
exception or the Notes accompanying it that courts should, in addition to 
requiring contemporaneity, weigh the degree of the speaker’s calculation.  
You need not be Justice Antonin Scalia to recognize that a string-type citation 
to a case in Notes does not provide courts with the authority to elevate every 
comment in the cited case to a position on par with the text of an evidence 
rule—particularly if the Committee was undoubtedly aware of the pertinent 
language and chose not to include or even comment on it.136 
There is little more to say about the practice of adding requirements to a 
carefully codified hearsay exception.  Federal courts, and most state courts, 
simply lack the authority to reconfigure their evidence rules.137  The U.S. 
Supreme Court has made the point explicitly: 
 
 130. Woods, 301 F.3d at 562 (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 249 F.3d 643, 646–47 (7th 
Cir. 2001)). 
 131. 161 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. 1942). 
 132. FED. R. EVID. 803(1)–(2) advisory committee’s notes on proposed rules (Exceptions 
(1) and (2)). 
 133. Houston Oxygen Co., 161 S.W.2d at 476. 
 134. FED. R. EVID. 803(1)–(2) advisory committee’s notes on proposed rules (Exceptions 
(1) and (2)). 
 135. Id. (“Since unexciting events are less likely to evoke comment, decisions involving 
Exception (1) are far less numerous.  Illustrative are Tampa Elec. Co. v. Getrost, 151 Fla. 558, 
10 So.2d 83 (1942); Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, 139 Tex. 1, 161 S.W.2d 474 (1942); and 
cases cited in McCormick § 273, p. 585, n. 4.”).  For those keeping score, the “two words” 
are:  “Illustrative are.” Id. 
 136. For a sense of Justice Scalia’s views about reliance on even clear guidance in the 
Advisory Committee Notes to override or supplement the text of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence themselves, see Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 167–68 (1995) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 137. See, e.g., United States v. DiMaria, 727 F.2d 265, 272 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that the 
“scheme of the Rules” is “preferable to requiring preliminary determinations of the judge,” 
which could result in “delay, prejudgment and encroachment on the province of the jury”). 
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When Congress enacted the prohibition against admission of hearsay in 
Rule 802, it placed 24 exceptions in Rule 803 and 5 additional exceptions 
in Rule 804.  Congress thus presumably made a careful judgment as to what 
hearsay may come into evidence and what may not.  To respect its 
determination, we must enforce the words that it enacted.138 
This follows from the general principle that rules of evidence enacted through 
a legislative process must be respected in the same manner as statutes.139  
Courts do not boldly announce that they have improved statutes by adding a 
requirement not found in the text.  Evidence rules are no different.  
Supplementing the textual requirements of discrete hearsay rules with vague, 
ill-defined requirements is particularly noxious as it defeats the very purpose 
of codified evidence rules. 
This leads to the second problem with applying the calculated narration 
caveat to screen police body camera statements:  the requirement is 
incoherent.  This is illustrated by how the Seventh Circuit in Woods seemed 
to draw a line between the informant’s musings to himself (admissible) and 
those communicated to police officers (inadmissible) because the latter were 
calculated and the former (apparently) just oozed out.140  This would 
counterintuitively suggest, contrary to Fischer, that a police officer’s 
monologue on a body camera video would be admissible.  Of course, many 
courts would disagree—and there would be no way to declare a winner.  This 
is because there is only an illusory line between calculated and uncalculated 
statements or, in the Woods court’s words, between statements made with or 
without “a reason.” 
The present sense impression exception itself is specifically designed for 
statements that are not emotionally driven and instead represent calm 
narrations of observed events.141  In each instance, the speaker must observe 
something, decide whether or not to describe the event, and then choose the 
words that best communicate the intended sentiment.  Calculation is 
inevitable and happens in the blink of an eye.142  After all, “[e]verything a 
person says is calculated to some degree.”143  Any distinction between 
calculated and spontaneous narration, then, is merely one of degree.  This 
reveals the calculated narration requirement’s “fatal flaw”:  “the difficulty of 
actually distinguishing ‘calculated narration’ from spontaneous description 
in proffered hearsay statements.”144  The courts actually recognize this 
problem, noting, for example, that “[o]ne can still make statements without 
calculated narration even if made in responses to questions.”145  But that 
concession gives away the game because “a response to a question is clearly 
 
 138. United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 322 (1992). 
 139. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993) (“We 
interpret the legislatively enacted Federal Rules of Evidence as we would any statute.”). 
 140. See United States v. Woods, 301 F.3d 556, 562 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 141. See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text. 
 142. See 30B WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 16, § 6815. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 797 (7th Cir. 2014). 
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calculated in the sense that the respondent must hear and understand the 
question, and then formulate a preferred response.”146  This means that the 
doctrine rests on an illusory distinction between statements made with and 
without calculation.  This freedom allows courts “to reject otherwise 
qualifying hearsay statements based, consciously or unconsciously, on other 
considerations, including improper ones, such as their views of the relative 
merits of the parties’ underlying positions.”147  The doctrine contains an 
unmistakable hint of the courts “assessing the credibility of the out-of-court 
declarant, an enterprise better suited to the jury”148—something the 
Committee condemns in another context as “altogether atypical.”149 
In light of the imprecise and atextual nature of the calculated narration 
requirement, courts should not rely on this judicially manufactured concept 
to exclude police body camera statements offered under the present sense 
impression exception.  Importantly, many of the concerns that motivate the 
calculated narration requirement can be legitimately operationalized through 
other evidentiary rules and the Confrontation Clause, as discussed in the next 
sections. 
C.  The Law Enforcement Exception 
Courts seeking to capture the normative concerns regarding the reliability 
and fairness of the introduction of police body camera statements can find 
more solid ground in the so-called “law enforcement exception” to the public 
records hearsay exception.  The typical public records exception, illustrated 
by Rule 803(8), excepts from the hearsay prohibition records or statements 
of a public officer that set out matters observed while “under a legal duty to 
report,”150 provided that the opponent of the evidence does not show that “the 
source of information [or] other circumstances indicate a lack of 
trustworthiness.”151  Critically, however, Congress amended the rule before 
it became effective to include a caveat that precludes the admission “in a 
criminal case [of] a matter observed by law-enforcement personnel.”152  This 
law enforcement exception, in concert with the Confrontation Clause, is the 
 
 146. 30B WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 16, § 6815. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. FED. R. EVID. advisory committee’s notes on proposed rules (Introductory Note:  The 
Hearsay Problem) (“For a judge to exclude evidence because he does not believe it has been 
described as ‘altogether atypical, extraordinary.’” (quoting James H. Chadbourn, Bentham and 
the Hearsay Rule—A Benthamic View of Rule 63(4)(c) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 75 
HARV. L. REV. 932, 947 (1962))); cf. Chadbourn, supra, at 947 (criticizing the Uniform Rules’ 
provision for exclusion of out-of-court statements not made in “good faith” as violating the 
“time-honored formula” that “credibility is a matter of fact for the jury, not a matter of law for 
the court”); Margaret Bull Kovera et al., Jurors’ Perceptions of Eyewitness and Hearsay 
Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REV. 703, 704 (1992) (concluding from results of empirical analysis of 
a mock juror study that “jurors are, in fact, skeptical of hearsay evidence and capable of 
differentiating between accurate and inaccurate hearsay testimony”). 
 150. FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(A)(ii). 
 151. Id. r. 803(8)(B). 
 152. Id. r. 803(8)(A)(ii). 
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key evidentiary limitation on the admissibility of police officer statements 
captured in body camera video.153 
Congress added the law enforcement exception to the originally proposed 
public records exception specifically to prevent prosecutors from relying on 
official records containing police officer hearsay.154  The provision’s author, 
Congressman David Dennis of Indiana, explained the rationale as follows: 
[You] should not be able to put in the police report to prove your case 
without calling the policeman.  I think in a criminal case you ought to have 
to call the policeman on the beat and give the defendant the chance to cross 
examine him, rather than just reading the report into evidence.  That is the 
purpose of this amendment.155 
Other representatives spoke in support, all signaling the same intent:  to 
prevent the introduction of a police report “without calling the policeman” to 
testify.156  Congressman Jim Johnson of Colorado drew on his experience as 
a prosecutor in state court to emphasize that “good cross-examination was 
one of the principal elements in any criminal trial.”157  Johnson continued:  
“If the officer who made the investigation is not available for cross-
examination, then you cannot have a fair trial.  I cannot believe the gentleman 
would be saying that we should be able to convict people where the police 
officer’s statement is not subject to cross-examination.”158  Congressman 
John Hunt of New Jersey added: 
The only time I can recall in my 34 years of law enforcement that a report 
of an investigator was admissible in court was to test the credibility of an 
officer. . . .  We would never even think about bringing in a report in lieu 
of the officer being there to have that officer cross-examined; but reports 
were admitted as evidentiary fact for the purpose of testing the officer’s 
credibility and perhaps to refresh his memory.159 
Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman of New York expressed her 
understanding that the amendment “reaffirms the right of cross examination 
to the accused.”160 
As these excerpts from the Congressional Record indicate, Congress 
focused “on a prototypical potential abuse of the proposed [public records 
exception], the admission of police reports relating to the charged crime in 
lieu of live testimony from the involved officer.”161  Giving effect to this 
congressional intent, courts do not permit prosecutors to introduce police 
 
 153. See 30B WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 16, § 6885. 
 154. FED. R. EVID. 803(8) advisory committee’s notes to the Senate Judiciary Report No. 
93-1277. 
 155. 120 CONG. REC. 2387 (1973) (statement of Rep. Dennis).  For a helpful compendium 
of legislative history, see RICHARD D. FRIEDMAN & JOSHUA DEAHL, FEDERAL RULES OF 
EVIDENCE:  TEXT AND HISTORY (2015). 
 156. 120 CONG. REC. 2387 (1973) (statement of Rep. Dennis). 
 157. Id. at 2388 (statement of Rep. Johnson). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. (statement of Rep. Hunt). 
 160. Id. (statement of Rep. Holtzman). 
 161. 30B WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 16, § 6885. 
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reports by simply switching to related hearsay exceptions, like the business 
records exception in Rule 803(6)—even though that exception does not 
include a law enforcement exception.162 
The more general question of whether individual statements made by 
police officers can be admitted under other hearsay exceptions, like the 
excited utterance exception, is complicated by Congress’s inattention to this 
detail.  Generally, failure “to gain admission through one hearsay exception 
has no bearing on that evidence’s admissibility under another hearsay 
exception.”163  For example, an “exclamation after a severe injury [would] 
not qualify for admission as a dying declaration [but that] does not preclude 
its admission as an excited utterance.”164  This follows from the general 
structure of the rules.  Hearsay prohibitions, like the representative Rule 802, 
typically state that “[h]earsay is not admissible unless any of the following 
provides otherwise.”165  Rule 802 includes “these rules” as one of the sources 
of authority for the admission of hearsay.166  Rules like Rule 803, then, 
provide a laundry list of discrete exceptions, preceded by the generic 
language:  “The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay.”167  
From this structure, the everyday practice of courts, and common sense, it is 
clear that it is not disqualifying if an out-of-court statement that fits within 
one hearsay exception fails to qualify for admission under another exception.  
It is expected. 
The argument that, in the case of police reports, the law enforcement 
exception trumps other rules of admissibility is based on Congress’s apparent 
intent, excerpted above, “to restrict the introduction of police reports against 
criminal defendants generally.”168  Exactly how far this intent sweeps, 
however, is unclear.  While the evidence rules typically enjoy a distinguished 
status as refreshingly clear and cohesive, there are inconsistencies and 
ambiguities.  These blights are often, as here, a result of congressional 
intrusions into the more comprehensive and precise designs of the Advisory 
Committee.  Congress sometimes acts without the evidentiary big picture in 
mind and without providing thorough written explanations that round up any 
interpretive loose ends.  In this case, it appears that Congress simply did not 
consider how broadly the law enforcement exception should apply.  As a 
result, the path forward requires divining Congress’s intent in the face of an 
ambiguous textual command and a few generic comments on the House 
 
 162. See, e.g., United States v. Weiland, 420 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[P]ublic 
records . . . must be admitted, if at all, under Rule 803(8) . . . .”); United States v. Versaint, 
849 F.2d 827, 831 & n.9 (3d Cir. 1988) (concluding that a police report was properly analyzed 
under Rule 803(8) and citing cases suggesting the inapplicability of Rule 803(6) to police 
reports); United States v. Cain, 615 F.2d 380, 382 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 163. 30B WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 16, § 6885. 
 164. Id. 
 165. FED. R. EVID. 802. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. r. 803. 
 168. 30B WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 16, § 6885.  “Debate exists over whether a public 
report inadmissible under Rule 803(8) is nonetheless admissible under one of the other hearsay 
exceptions.” United States v. Nixon, 779 F.2d 126, 134 (2d Cir. 1985). 
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floor.  And here, the congressional intent to preclude reliance on police 
reports does not seem to be all-encompassing.  Congressman Hunt’s remarks 
themselves suggest an area where police reports can be used—to aid a 
testifying officer to recollect specific facts.169  The logic seems to extend to 
admission of police reports under the recorded recollection exception.170  
Further, a constant sentiment in the remarks of those who spoke in support 
of the law enforcement exception was the need to ensure cross-examination 
of any officer whose official commentary on an incident made its way into 
evidence.171  This suggests that the law enforcement exception should bar 
any hearsay statement by a law enforcement officer offered through 
exceptions other than the public records exception, only if the following two 
criteria are met:  (1) it is a statement authored pursuant to the police officer’s 
law enforcement obligations (i.e., “while under a legal duty to report”); and 
(2) the officer does not testify. 
Courts should apply this clear congressional intent any time prosecutors 
offer police officer statements through a hearsay exception.  Congress 
undoubtedly intended the law enforcement exception to apply generally, not 
solely to official reports offered under the public record hearsay exception.  
The representatives who introduced and spoke in favor of the law 
enforcement exception to the public records exception would find no solace 
in the admission of a police report in lieu of police officer testimony simply 
because the prosecution cited another hearsay exception.  The clearest 
illustration of this principle is that the prosecution cannot rely on the business 
records exception to admit a police report, since that exception is just the 
analogue of the public records exception for organizations that do not fall 
into the governmental category.  At the same time, police officer statements 
that do not fit the public records paradigm, that is, are not uttered as part of 
the police officer’s official duties (“while under a legal duty to report”),172 
should not be captured by the law enforcement exclusion.  Thus, a true 
excited utterance by a police officer—such as “he’s got my gun!”—does not 
 
 169. See FED. R. EVID. 803(8) advisory committee’s notes to Senate Judiciary Report No. 
93-1277.  “State courts . . . allow law enforcement officers to ‘read their reports into the record 
when they lack a sufficient present recollection to testify from memory.’” State v. Vigil, 336 
P.3d 380, 387 (N.M. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting State v. Scally, 758 P.2d 365, 366 (Or. Ct. App. 
1988)).  In such circumstances, since the witness purports to be testifying from a refreshed 
memory, the hearsay prohibition has no application. 30B WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 16, 
§ 6852 (“When the witness testifies based on a refreshed recollection, the witness is still 
testifying from memory, as in any other presentation of live witness testimony. . . .  If this 
process is followed, there is no hearsay bar to testimony based on a refreshed memory, and a 
hearsay exception is not required.”). 
 170. See United States v. Picciandra, 788 F.2d 39, 44 (1st Cir. 1986) (noting that the 
admission of a law enforcement report as a recorded recollection did not prejudice 
defendants); United States v. Sawyer, 607 F.2d 1190, 1193 (7th Cir. 1979) (finding an agent’s 
memorandum admissible under the recorded recollection exception where the agent testified 
and was available for cross-examination); Goy v. Jones, 72 P.3d 351, 353–54 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2003) (finding a police report admissible under the recorded recollection exception); State v. 
Scally, 758 P.2d 365, 366 (Or. Ct. App. 1988) (noting that a police officer was permitted to 
read a report into the record as a recorded recollection). 
 171. See supra notes 155–62 and accompanying text. 
 172. FED. R. EVID. 803(8). 
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come within the prohibition contemplated by Congress.  Such a statement is 
simply not the type of public record, or official law enforcement statement, 
referenced in the public records exception or the congressional remarks 
emphasizing the need for a limitation.  Present sense impressions captured 
on police body camera videos fall somewhere between a public record and 
an excited utterance. 
To the extent a police officer narrates a body camera video to memorialize 
and highlight information relevant to future proceedings, the statements fall 
within the first criterion set forth above:  a statement or report authored 
pursuant to the officer’s law enforcement obligations (i.e., “while under a 
legal duty to report”).173  These statements fit the mold of out-of-court 
statements by a law enforcement officer that Congress intended to exclude 
through the law enforcement exception.  Thus, even if those statements fit 
within hearsay exceptions other than the public records exception, they must 
be excluded if the officer-declarant does not also testify. 
There remains the question of whether the law enforcement exception 
should preclude admission of these statements even if the officer-declarant 
testifies.  As the above discussion suggests, Congress’s primary concern in 
this context was the admission of police reports in lieu of police officer 
testimony.  In that scenario, the defendant is denied the ability to cross-
examine the police officer.  When the police officer testifies, this concern 
evaporates.  The defense attorney can cross-examine the police officer about 
any disputed statement captured in the video evidence.  The congressional 
focus on circumstances where a police report is introduced instead of police 
officer testimony suggests the absence of a congressional intent to override 
admissibility in these circumstances.  Further, since the police officer can 
review video prior to testifying, and prosecutors can introduce recorded 
recollections of forgetful testifying witnesses, it is unlikely that important 
statements captured in body camera video will fail to make their way into the 
trial in some form during the recording officer’s testimony.  The police 
officer will likely testify directly as to the observations themselves.  And to 
the extent the defense attacks the police officer’s credibility, the recorded 
statements may become admissible as prior consistent statements.174  This 
means that if a police officer’s statements qualify for admission under a 
hearsay exception (like the present sense impression exception) and the 
police officer testifies, courts should not exclude those statements under the 
law enforcement exception.  There is nothing in the text of the rules that 
would support that result, and the congressional intent to preclude such 
 
 173. Id. 
[C]ourts do not interpret the “legal duty” provision to require that a statute or other 
legal rule explicitly impose a duty on the declarant or agency to report a particular 
observation.  “Rather, it suffices if the nature of the responsibilities assigned to the 
public agency are such that the record is appropriate to the function of the agency.” 
30B WRIGHT & BELLIN, supra note 16, § 6884 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 762 F.3d 852, 
862 (9th Cir. 2014)). 
 174. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) (permitting out-of-court statements offered to 
rehabilitate a declarant’s credibility to be introduced as substantive evidence). 
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evidence is limited to circumstances where the evidence is offered in lieu of 
police officer testimony. 
Congress intended the law enforcement exception to prevent prosecutors 
from introducing official police statements in lieu of testimony from the 
police officer who authored those statements.  This does not mean, however, 
that if the officer-declarant testifies, police body camera statements (and 
other police reports) can be introduced through the public records exception 
itself (as opposed to through other exceptions, like the present sense 
impression exception).175  The distinction comes from the text of the public 
records exception, Rule 803(8)(A)(ii), which excludes law enforcement 
statements without reference to whether the officer-declarant testifies.  This 
clear text trumps the above analysis in the narrow context of the admission 
of police body camera statements under the public records exception.  As 
explained already, with respect to admission of hearsay under other 
exceptions, however, the law enforcement exception’s application is (at best) 
ambiguous.  In that circumstance, it is necessary to examine congressional 
intent more broadly, leading to the conclusion reached above that the officer-
declarant’s testimony is sufficient to overcome the law enforcement 
exception. 
D.  The Confrontation Clause 
The above analysis parallels the second legal doctrine that legitimately 
captures the normative concerns about police body camera statements:  the 
Confrontation Clause.176  The Confrontation Clause trumps any hearsay 
exceptions with respect to the admissibility of police officer hearsay offered 
against a criminal defendant.177  Under the pre-2004 Ohio v. Roberts178 
regime, courts swept aside Confrontation Clause objections by pointing to 
the applicability of any well-established hearsay exception or generic 
reliability guarantees.179  After Crawford v. Washington180 in 2004, that is 
no longer the case.181 
 
 175. Cf. United States v. Hayes, 861 F.2d 1225, 1230 (10th Cir. 1988) (stating that the law 
enforcement exception does not apply to the files in question “because Vest, the I.R.S. 
employee who searched Hayes’ files and obtained the computer documents, testified at trial”). 
 176. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him.” Id. 
 177. It should be noted that the analysis under the Confrontation Clause applies equally in 
both state and federal contexts, as the U.S. Supreme Court has long made clear. See Pointer v. 
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965) (holding that the Sixth Amendment “is ‘to be enforced 
against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards that 
protect those personal rights against federal encroachment’” (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 
U.S. 1, 10 (1964)).  Thus, the Confrontation Clause analysis in this Article applies equally to 
the states. 
 178. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 179. Id. at 66.  This explains Congress’s concern, discussed in Part III.C, about the potential 
introduction of police reports without cross-examination. 
 180. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 181. Id. at 68–69. 
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Under Crawford and its progeny, whether an out-of-court statement 
implicates the Confrontation Clause depends on how the statement came 
about, or its “primary purpose.”182  The inquiry is an objective one 
considering all the circumstances giving rise to the statement.183  If a 
statement is made or elicited “with the primary purpose of creating evidence 
for . . . prosecution,” it is testimonial.184  If the statement is made or elicited 
with some other primary purpose, such as to evaluate and respond to an 
ongoing emergency or as part of a casual conversation among friends, the 
statement is “nontestimonial” and does not implicate the Confrontation 
Clause.185  Thus, the reenergized post-2004 Confrontation Clause doctrine 
prohibits hearsay that is otherwise admissible under many hearsay 
exceptions, including the present sense impression exception.  In fact, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has already applied this doctrine in an analogous 
context, ruling that a government lab report identifying a substance as an 
illicit narcotic could not be offered under the public records hearsay 
exception against a criminal defendant absent cross-examination of the 
analyst who authored it.186  In language that is applicable to the instant 
context, the Court said: 
Business and public records are generally admissible absent confrontation 
not because they qualify under an exception to the hearsay rules, but 
because—having been created for the administration of an entity’s affairs 
and not for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial—they 
are not testimonial.  Whether or not they qualify as business or official 
records, the analysts’ statements here—prepared specifically for use at 
petitioner’s trial—were testimony against petitioner, and the analysts were 
subject to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.187 
This same analysis should apply to hearsay statements of other public 
officials (e.g., police officers) offered under other hearsay exceptions (e.g., 
the present sense impression exception).  To the extent those out-of-court 
statements were generated with an eye toward later proceedings, they would 
be testimonial.  This revitalized corner of confrontation doctrine will prohibit 
the use of many police body camera statements, particularly those that 
constitute self-conscious narration of incriminating events (e.g., “suspect 
smells of alcohol”). 
Confrontation Clause doctrine also provides a helpful shortcut for courts 
attempting to divine the congressional intent in enacting the law enforcement 
exception to the public records hearsay exception.  The Confrontation 
Clause’s directives largely parallel the law enforcement exception and 
unequivocally override any inconsistent evidence rules.  This is because the 
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same concerns that motivated the representatives who championed the law 
enforcement exception in 1974 animate the current Confrontation Clause 
doctrine.188  The key question in a typical fact scenario becomes whether a 
hearsay statement is testimonial and, if so, whether the police officer who 
made the statement testifies.  As this analysis comfortably tracks the similar 
concerns that motivated Congress to enact the law enforcement exception, as 
well as that exception’s text and application, admissibility questions will 
often be resolved solely through application of the Confrontation Clause. 
The Confrontation Clause analysis will often be straightforward.  Police 
body camera statements will not always be made “with the primary purpose 
of creating evidence for . . . prosecution,”189 but they will often have that 
purpose.  For example, the police officer’s statements in Fischer, described 
above, seem clearly motivated to create a record for a later trial.190  
Importantly, the inquiry is objective—it looks at all of the circumstances 
surrounding the making of the statement.191  Key factors for courts to 
consider are the purpose of body cameras themselves—to provide formal 
evidence of police-citizen interactions—and police officers’ general 
knowledge of that purpose.192  The absence of other purposes for most police 
body camera statements will also be critical.  After all, why else apart from 
generating evidence would a police officer be narrating interactions captured 
on body camera video?  In light of these considerations, most monologues 
by a police officer describing events of evidentiary significance will qualify 
as “testimonial.”  But there will certainly be exceptions.  In extreme 
circumstances, such as those likely to generate excited utterances, the police 
officer’s purpose in making statements may become nontestimonial. 
A case that illustrates the hidden complexity of this analysis is United 
States v. Polidore.193  There, the Fifth Circuit evaluated the admissibility of 
an anonymous caller’s recorded statements to 911.194  The caller described 
drug dealing going on outside his home.195  The Fifth Circuit deemed the 
statements elicited by the 911 operator to be nontestimonial.196  The court 
explained: 
[T]he primary purpose . . . was neither to “enable police assistance to meet 
an ongoing emergency” nor to “establish or prove past events potentially 
relevant to later criminal prosecution.”  Rather, the primary purpose of the 
interrogation was to gather information necessary for the police to respond 
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to a report of ongoing criminal activity. . . .  [W]e conclude that the 
declarant’s statements were not testimonial; under the totality of the 
circumstances, the primary purpose of the interrogation was not to create 
an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.197 
This type of analysis may blur the line somewhat when police officers 
communicate to each other and those statements are captured on a body 
camera video.  In such circumstances, purposes other than creating a record 
for later proceedings become plausible.  Because some other purposes may 
be official but not testimonial, the law enforcement exception may still play 
a role in excluding otherwise admissible police body camera statements.  But 
for the paradigmatic—and most worrisome—statements discussed in this 
Article, where a police officer narrates events to no audience except the body 
camera, the testimonial nature of those utterances will be all but indisputable. 
Even if a court finds that certain police body camera statements are 
testimonial, the inquiry does not end.  The Confrontation Clause has no 
application to out-of-court statements if the declarant testifies at trial.  As the 
Court explained in Crawford, “when the declarant appears for cross-
examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on 
the use of his prior testimonial statements.”198  This means that even with 
respect to testimonial statements, the defendant’s confrontation right is 
satisfied by the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.  As a result, if 
the police officer who made the proffered body camera statements appears at 
trial, the Confrontation Clause is satisfied.  As noted earlier, this tracks the 
analysis of the law enforcement exception discussed in previous sections.199  
Police officer testimony also obviates Congress’s primary concern in 
creating the law enforcement exception that the prosecution not present an 
official record “without calling the policeman” who authored that record to 
testify.200 
The above analysis resolves the most normatively problematic instances 
of police body camera statements.  Efforts to introduce police officer 
narrations of incriminating events without the police officer’s live testimony 
will be blocked by both the law enforcement exception and the Confrontation 
Clause.  If, however, the officer-declarant testifies, police body camera 
statements that fit within the present sense impression, excited utterance, or 
recorded recollection exceptions201 should not be barred by these provisions. 
E.  Police Body Camera Statements Offered by the Defense 
In some circumstances, the defense may seek to introduce police body 
camera statements as evidence at trial.  Police officers will inevitably make 
 
 197. Id. at 712 (citations omitted). 
 198. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004). 
 199. See supra notes 155–62. 
 200. See supra notes 155–62; see also 120 CONG. REC. 2387 (1973) (statement of Rep. 
Dennis). 
 201. The same analysis would apply for other, less frequently applicable exceptions like 
the state of mind exception. See FED. R. EVID. 803(3). 
2019] ADMISSIBILITY OF BODY CAMERA EVIDENCE 1455 
observations and assertions on body camera videos that undermine the 
prosecution.  To the extent the defense offers such statements solely to 
impeach contrary testimony by the same police officer, no hearsay exception 
is needed.  The statement can be offered for a purpose other than the truth of 
the matter asserted:  specifically, to undermine the testifying police officer’s 
credibility.202  The defense may, however, also seek to introduce a testifying 
police officer’s out-of-court statement as evidence of the truth of what the 
police officer (previously) asserted (i.e., as substantive evidence).  Or the 
defense may seek to introduce a nontestifying police officer’s out-of-court 
statement captured on a body camera video (e.g., a description of a suspect 
that does not match the defendant).203  In these circumstances, the defense 
will need to navigate the hearsay rules, even though the normative concerns 
described at the outset of this Article largely fade away.  The analysis will be 
similar to that described in the preceding three sections except, critically, the 
Confrontation Clause does not apply.204 
Assuming a police body camera statement qualifies for admission under a 
hearsay exception (e.g., the present sense impression exception), the defense 
should have little trouble admitting the statement.  Since the Confrontation 
Clause has no application to evidence offered by the defense,205 the only 
plausible grounds for exclusion are (1) the calculated narration exception to 
the present sense impression exception, and (2) the law enforcement 
exception to the public records hearsay exception.  As already discussed, the 
calculated narration exception applied by a few courts has no support in the 
Federal Rules of Evidence and so should not be applied in any circumstances, 
much less to prevent the introduction of police body camera statements by 
the defense.206  The law enforcement exception, by contrast, arises from an 
evidence rule’s text, and that text makes no distinction between statements 
offered by the prosecution or the defense.207  As the rationale for the law 
enforcement exception is solely concerned with prosecution-sponsored 
evidence, however, courts are open to the argument that the law enforcement 
exception has no application to evidence offered by the defense.208  Such 
efforts set up a classic text-versus-rationale fight with respect to evidence 
offered solely under the public records exception.  The explicit text of the 
Rule would prohibit the statements even if offered by the defense, while the 
Rule’s clear and documented rationale—preventing unfairness to 
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defendants—counsels an opposite conclusion.  But as already discussed, the 
fight will rarely be dispositive. 
Most police body camera statements will qualify for admission under 
hearsay exceptions other than the public records exception, particularly the 
present sense impression exception.209  In that circumstance, it makes little 
sense to apply the law enforcement caveat to the public records exception to 
exclude the evidence.  A police body camera statement that meets the terms 
of the present sense impression hearsay exception, for example, should be 
readily admitted when offered by the defense.  For the reasons already 
discussed in this Part, courts would be stretching congressional intent too far 
to enforce the law enforcement exception to bar evidence offered by the 
defense under another rule, that is, an exception other than the public records 
exception itself.  And, again, the Confrontation Clause has no application, 
even if the police officer does not testify, because the prosecution cannot 
claim any right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.  The only 
caveat is that in jurisdictions where courts disqualify statements offered 
under the present sense impression if deemed to be the result of calculated 
narration, this illegitimate barrier to evidence would apply even to defense 
evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The widespread consensus that body cameras are necessary to restore 
public trust and ensure police accountability means that body cameras and 
their resulting video will become an integral component of everyday police 
work.  As a result, body cameras will be used not just to protect citizens from 
unlawful uses of force, but also to establish citizens’ guilt in criminal 
prosecutions.  Yet, the scholarly conversation has included little discussion 
of this use of body cameras and largely ignored the admissibility of police 
officer statements captured in the videos.  In light of police officers’ 
unilateral control of body cameras, many of the scenarios courts encounter 
will raise important normative concerns about the reliability and fairness of 
the introduction of this evidence against criminal defendants.  As explained 
above, these concerns are largely captured by the array of evidence rules 
implicated by police body camera statements. 
Reconciling the various rules leads to the following guidance:  police 
officer statements captured in body camera video can be introduced as 
substantive evidence against a criminal defendant if the statements qualify 
for admission under certain hearsay exceptions and are either 
(1) “nontestimonial” as that term is defined in the Supreme Court’s post-
2004 Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, or (2) the police officer who made 
the out-of-court statement testifies.  Consistent application of this framework 
faithfully applies existing evidence doctrine to this new form of evidence and 
largely protects against the most normatively problematic scenarios of police 
body camera evidence.  Against a backdrop of steady complaints of the 
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unsuitability of aging legal doctrine to new technology,210 courts, scholars, 
and litigants should celebrate this instance where existing doctrine, while 
messy and complex, maps well onto new normative concerns.  Courts need 
only recognize that framework and apply it consistently in this novel and 
important evidentiary context. 
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